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ABSTRACT: Polish-German relations in the first half of 2014 were dominated by 
the Ukraine crisis. This study is an attempt to answer the question of how Polish 
and German press assessed the cooperation of both countries in resolving the con-
flict in Ukraine; to what extent the most widely read magazines associated them-
selves with the decisions of their politicians and the feelings of their own societies 
and how much understanding they showed for the arguments of their EU partner. 
The analysis focuses on the unprecedented mission of the Weimar Triangle foreign 
ministers to Ukraine in February 2014, which led to an agreement between the 
Ukrainian opposition and President Viktor Yanukovych. A turning point was the 
visit paid by Radoslaw Sikorski and Frank-Walter Steinmeier to St. Petersburg in 
June 2014. The next meetings agreed on by EU partners were held without inviting 
the Polish partner. In view of the speed of events in the selected time interval, the 
articles subjected to analysis were taken from the most widely read online editions 
of national daily newspapers in Poland and Germany.
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Polish-German relations in the first half of 2014 were domi-
nated by the crisis in Ukraine. Ukraine’s rejection of the associ-
ation agreement with the European Union (November 2013), the 
most serious anti-government grass-roots protests since 2004, 
the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and finally, 
the Ukrainian-Russian conflict proved to be the beginning of a sea 
change on the European continent. At the end of 2013, elections 
to the Bundestag took place in Germany, from which emerged 
a new coalition government, composed of the two largest parties 
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– the SPD (Social Democratic Party) and the CDU/CSU (Christian 
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union). The main leaders of this 
Grand Coalition declared their willingness to boost and standardize 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, in which the association agree-
ment would continue to play a central role. Declarations by the lead-
ing politicians suggested a tightening of Polish-German cooperation 
within the Union. In the coalition agreement signed in December 
2013, the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats assured Po-
land of their intention to cooperate closely on European and Atlantic 
integration and stressed not only that Poland, alongside France, was 
of priority importance for German foreign policy, but also pointed 
to their immediate eastern neighbour as an entity that would have 
a decisive influence on the shape of EU policy towards Russia. In his 
inaugural speech delivered on December 17th 2013, Germany’s new 
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier criticized Russia for exert-
ing pressure on Ukraine and questioned the European Union’s policy 
towards Russia, which ignored Ukraine’s strong dependence on Rus-
sia (Fix, Gawrich, 2014: 2). Such declarations met the expectations 
of Poland, whose ambition was to act as Eastern European advocate 
and which conducted an active Eastern policy within the EU. Gain-
ing the support of Germany was perceived as key to the success of 
the Community’s initiatives (Patecka-Frauenfelder, 2014: 110–132). 
The beginning of 2014 provided hopes for the optimistic sce-
nario of a common eastern policy among EU partners. An example 
of cooperation at the highest level was the mission of foreign min-
isters from the Weimar Triangle to Kiev and the negotiations that 
concluded with an agreement between the Ukrainian authorities 
and the Euromaidan democratic forces in February 2014 (Łada, 
2014). Another joint initiative of the Polish and German foreign 
ministers in June 2014, using the term the Kaliningrad Triangle in-
vented that same year, proved ineffective in building an agreement 
with Russia. From the German point of view, the Normandy format, 
agreed upon in June 2014 as an interim solution among represent-
atives of EU states and heads of governments, proved to be more 
‘pragmatic’(Buras, 2014–2015, pp. 15–17). The following article 
will attempt to answer the question of how the Polish and German 
press assessed the cooperation between foreign ministers in resolv-
ing the conflict in Ukraine. While the most widely read magazines 
associated themselves with the decisions of their politicians and 
the feelings of their own societies and showed understanding for 
the arguments of their EU partner, in the article analysis was lim-
ited to such events as Poland’s and Germany’s participation in the 
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negotiations between the opposition and Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych and the June visit of Radoslaw Sikorski and Frank-
Walter Steinmeier to St. Petersburg and an attempt has been made 
to analyze the profiles of ministers in the press of the other coun-
try. The article does not include the contribution of Donald Tusk’s 
broad diplomatic offensive during this period, (in late January and 
early February the Polish Prime Minister in the course of a few 
days met with the heads of the European Commission and the Eu-
ropean Parliament, the French President, the German Chancellor, 
the Prime Ministers of the UK, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in order to es-
tablish a common EU position on the Ukraine crisis) and Angela 
Merkel (telephone diplomacy, and numerous talks, primarily with 
the Russian President). No analysis was made of the comparisons 
in the Polish and German press in connection with the attitude 
of the German chancellor and the German foreign minister to the 
crisis in Ukraine.
In view of the dynamics of the situation in the selected time 
period, a qualitative analysis has been conducted of articles se-
lected from the most widely read online editions of national dailies 
in Poland and Germany. Research material was provided by Gazeta 
Wyborcza (hereafter referred to as GW), Rzeczpospolita (hereafter 
referred to as Rz), Dziennik. Gazeta Prawna (hereafter referred to as 
DzGP), and Nasz Dziennik (hereafter referred to as NDz). In the 
case of the German press, the articles included were by journal-
ists associated with such dailies as Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(hereafter referred to as FAZ), Süddeutsche Zeitung (hereafter re-
ferred to as SZ), Die Welt1 and texts from the most popular German 
magazine Der Spiegel. In the latter’s case, abandoning the rule of 
selecting daily newspapers is justified by the very high readership of 
this weekly, both at home and abroad. FAZ presents conservative-
liberal views, SZ – liberal views, while Die Welt is a Springer owned 
daily intended for conservative readers. Der Spiegel is addressed 
to liberal-left readers. The above selection allows for a fuller picture 
1 The dailies referred to have for years enjoyed enduring popularity among 
German readers and are recognized as an important influential voice in Germany. 
Interest in these examples of the printed press translates into a high number 
of visits to web pages of these newspapers. Compare H. Pürer, J. Raabe, Presse 
in Deutschland, Konstanz 2007, p. 445; and the latest press readership survey 
on Internet portals, conducted by i.a. http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/stud-
ie/13032/umfrage/anzahl-der-nutzer-von-online-tageszeitungen-in-deutschland/ 
(access: 07.03.2014). 
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of the opinions built in Germany. Taking into account the press for 
supporters of the left-wing party ‘Die Linke’ would require a signifi-
cantly more thorough study. The dailies referred to have for years 
enjoyed enduring popularity among German readers and are recog-
nized as an important influential voice in Germany. Interest in these 
examples of the printed press translates into a high number of visits 
to web pages of these newspapers (Pürer, Raabe 2007: p. 445).
German media reacted lively to the events in Ukraine, showing 
much sympathy for the Euromaidan movement. Ukraine – widely 
regarded as a ‘blank spot’ in the consciousness of German society 
– became an important subject and one eagerly sought by German-
speaking readers. Germany’s increased interest in the affairs of 
Eastern Europe was welcomed in Poland with hopes for EU fo-
rum implementation of Poland’s scenario for building the EU’s re-
lations with its eastern neighbours. This was because up till that 
time, issues concerning the Union‘s Eastern neighbours had been 
viewed in German political and social discourse seen through the 
prism of relations with the Russian Federation, according to the 
principle of ‘Russland zuerst’ (Russia first). In the German public’s 
consciousness, ever since the arrest of the Pussy Riot group, the 
increasing discrimination against sexual minorities and the Krem-
lin’s crackdown on German non-governmental organizations active 
on Russian Federation soil, the attitude to Moscow had undergone 
a relative cooling. Poland hopefully reported this change in attitude 
to Russian President Vladimir Putin, still being cherished by Chan-
cellor Gerhard Schröder as a squeaky clean democrat. The Polish 
press closely followed the elections and the formation of a new gov-
ernment in Germany. The rise of the Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU 
and SPD) was accurately predicted. In the Polish press much space 
was given to speculation about Germany’s future foreign minister. 
It was assumed that in the event of an agreement between the two 
largest parties in Germany, this would be Frank-Walter Steinmeier, 
who had already fulfilled the function of head of diplomacy in the 
years 2005–2009 in Angela Merkel’s first government, was a trusted 
colleague of Gerhard Schröder and the author of the ‘Partnership 
for Modernisation’ project with Russia (Guział, 2002, pp. 42–47)2. 
For most Polish newspapers, the assumed selection of Germany’s 
2 Andrzej Guział outlined the basic principles of German policy towards Rus-
sia following the change of government in 2005. The Christian Democrat and 
Social-Democrat German government established in 2005 treated Russia as a stra-
tegic partner in all dimensions. 
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Foreign Ministry heads was initially a major cause for concern. Pol-
ish journalists did not share the opinion expressed in the pages of 
DzGP that one should not overestimate the role of Steinmeier who, 
according to that article’s author, was not an overly influential fig-
ure in his party, and since the outbreak of the crisis, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had lost its former position (Woś, 2013). In analyzes 
regarding the new composition of the German government, em-
phasis was laid on fears of German diplomacy returning to a pro-
Russian strategy resulting from Steinmeier’s Russian sympathies. 
Articles published in Polish national dailies, especially in Rz and 
GW highlighted in the greatest detail the process of Steinmeier’s 
change in image. While at the turn of September and October Rz 
reprimanded the future candidate for the position of head of Ger-
man diplomacy for too conciliatory an attitude towards the Russian 
Federation3, and GW, sharing those fears, confirmed that Moscow 
always worked well with the German Social Democrats (Radziwino-
wicz, 2013) then together with the progress in the formulation of 
a new government in Germany, opinions concerning Steinmeier be-
came more complementary. In late October, Piotr Jendroszczyk of 
Rz wrote that the election of a Social Democrat would be good for 
Poland, because of his close ties with Polish Foreign Minister Ra-
doslaw Sikorski (Jendroszczyk, Berlin szuka pomysłu na UE, 2013), 
and after Steinmeier’s official nomination as head of German diplo-
macy, he assured readers that Steinmeier is a politician who will 
not conduct a policy towards Russia over the heads of the Poles 
(Jendroszczyk, Trzecia kadencja podobna do poprzednich, 2013). 
Bartosz Wieliński of GW echoed that despite Steinmeier’s earlier 
commitment to the development of relations with Russia, his return 
does not mean another era of blind love in Russian-German relations. 
According to GW, a disappointed Berlin today does not trust Putin 
an inch and Russian-German relations are icy (Wieliński, Berlin nie 
wierzy Putinowi, 2014). Polish publicists referred to the words of the 
government’s plenipotentiary for German affairs Wladyslaw Bar-
toszewski, who explained in an interview with Rz that Steinmeier 
had learned a lot and in Merkel‘s office would conduct a balanced 
3 In early October, RP quoted the Die Zeit weekly, in which the author drew 
attention to Steinmeier’s pro-Russian attitude and his foreign policy conducted in 
2005-2009 under Angela Merkel‘s first government. Steinmeier believed that the 
era of confrontation was over, and offered Russia help in its reforms. Osk, ‘Die Zeit: 
Nowy MSZ może być zbyt przyjazny dla Rosji’, 02.10.2014, based on: www.rp.pl, 
02.10.2013, P. Jendroszczyk, ‘Trudne negocjacje koalicyjne w Berlinie blokują UE’, 
03.10.2013., based on: www.rp.pl.
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policy towards Russia (Wieliński, Berlin nie wierzy Putinowi, 2014). 
Rz and GW emphasized the growing importance of Poland, which 
was hoping to appear as an expert in matters of policy towards the 
EU’s eastern neighbours. Steinmeier‘s statement, made just after 
being sworn in, that he was going to Poland because, of all those 
in the EU, the Poles know Ukrainian specifics best was welcomed 
with a considerable degree of satisfaction, because it greatly con-
trasted with the opinions of Germans from previous years, when 
it was thought that the Poles were driven by anti-Russian phobias 
and therefore their opinions were worthless (Jendroszczyk, Trudne 
negocjacje koalicyjne w Berlinie blokują UE, 2013). GW and Rz wrote 
about a breakthrough in Polish-German relations (Wieliński, Berlin 
Warszawa – wspólna sprawa, 2013; Czech, 20013).
Warsaw’s enthusiasm did not escape the attention of the Ger-
man press. Konrad Schuller, since 2004 the FAZ correspondent for 
Poland and Ukraine, noted that the key word for rebuilding Stein-
meier’s image was the word ‘outrageous’. This was apparently how 
Steinmeier viewed the way the Kremlin exploited Ukraine’s weak-
ness, in order to prevent the signing of an association agreement 
with the EU (Schuller, 19.12.2013). Just a small rebuke of Moscow 
– continued the German correspondent – was enough to rehabili-
tate the German foreign minister in Warsaw (Schuller, 19.12.2013). 
In the same article the columnist pointed to a different model of 
thinking, which in his assessment differs from the new image of the 
head of German diplomacy forced by the media. An article entitled 
‘Gospodin Steinmeier’ appeared in mid-December in the Do Rzeczy 
weekly. Its authors had no illusions concerning the intentions of 
the new minister of foreign affairs, considered him a totally extraor-
dinary Russophile, and a faithful comrade ready to support Russia 
even in spite of and to the detriment of Western interests. They sug-
gested that his return was a clear signal to the world and above all 
Putin, in which direction German foreign policy would lean in the 
coming years (Magierowski, Florek-Mostowska, 2014). The image 
of Steinmeier presented by the Do Rzeczy weekly reflected the feel-
ings Polish right-wing conservative circles, whose initially hushed 
opinions emerged with strong accents in April 2014.
In the first quarter of 2014 the media in Germany also built 
a positive image of Polish-German relations. The country on the 
Vistula River grew to become an expert in all matters Ukrainian. 
The German press, in analyzes of the largest country in the Eastern 
Partnership quoted statements by Polish politicians, the main head-
lines of its dailies, and conducted FAZ-interviews with Bronislaw 
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Komorowski (28.11.2013) and leading an EU mission in Ukraine 
Aleksander Kwasniewski (Spiegel-Interview By Jan Puhl and Chris-
tian Nee, 09.12.2014). Attention was drawn to Steinmeier’s new 
view of Eastern Europe (Sattar, Ein neuer Blick nach Osten, 2014), 
and to the fact that Polish-German relations are good as they have 
never been before, which is proved i.a. by friendship between the 
German and Polish foreign ministers (Sturm, Steinmeier lehnt eine 
Vermittlerrolle ab, 2013).
Declarations of closer cooperation were soon to show their prac-
tical side. The EU‘s diplomatic mission to Kiev and the agreement 
concluded on February 21st 2014 used the formula of trilateral co-
operation within the Weimar Triangle (Lang, /2014–2015).
The activities of the foreign ministers of Germany, France and 
Poland led to a compromise being struck. The press in Poland and 
Germany described the dramatic developments in Ukraine (the 
increasing number of people killed, snipers shooting at protest-
ers, heavy street fighting, and the atmosphere of civil war) (dpa, 
21.02.2014). The trip made by the ministers was seen as an act 
of last resort (Puhl, 26.05.2014) aimed at stopping the spiral of 
violence (Ehrenstein, Lehnartz, Kellermann, 22.02.2014) and end-
ing the bloodshed. The press both in Poland and Germany also 
treated the purpose of the visit as a symbolic message that the EU 
speaks with one voice. Defects in the Kiev agreement were perceived 
(Maidan dissatisfaction, and lack of acceptance of the agreement 
by extremist forces acting among the demonstrators) (Parafianow-
icz, Potocki, 15.03.2014), but both stressed that the most impor-
tant goal had been achieved. The determination and effort made 
by the EU Ministers in Ukraine was duly noted, but they rated 
the contribution of each of the ministers differently. The foreign 
policy commentator for FAZ declared that the mission by the heads 
of German diplomacy was the most important challenge that the 
Weimar Triangle had ever had to face. In his opinion, the foreign 
ministers of Germany, France and Poland did not hesitate to throw 
all their authority on the scales to save Ukraine from an almost cer-
tain civil war (Frankenberger, 22.02.2014). Die Welt clearly pointed 
to Steinmeier as the initiator of the diplomatic mission, who saw 
in the achievement of the mission a way to stimulate the Weimar 
Triangle. The conservative daily admitted that although Poland had 
always actively worked for an EU rapprochement, Sikorski had 
in recent days spoken very sparingly, while Steinmeier demand-
ed sanctions against Ukraine (Ehrenstein, Lehnartz, Kellermann, 
22.02.2014). Der Spiegel too attributed to Steinmeier the central 
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role in appeasing the conflict. Discussing the events in Kiev, the 
German magazine’s columnist wrote about a trio of EU Ministers, 
who mustered round the head of German diplomacy, urging even 
their colleague Radoslaw Sikorski to interrupt his holiday in Inns-
bruck (Gebauer, Der Marathon-Diplomat, 2014). SZ agreed with the 
German press, which praised Steinmeier’s diplomacy but stressed 
that an equally important role in the mediation process in Kiev 
was played by Radoslaw Sikorski, who contrary to relations in that 
Steinmeier allegedly had to convince him to cut short his vaca-
tion, was the first to decide to mediate in the talks (Brössler, Reise 
ins ukrainische Chaos, 2014, by the same author, Albtraum Spal-
tung, 2014). SZ wrote about Sikorski as the most active of the active 
also in the context of internal political disputes in Poland and the 
criticisms aimed at the foreign minister by the ‘national-Catholic 
opposition’, which attacked Sikorski for urging the Ukrainian op-
position to accept the conditions of the compromise under threat 
of an increase in the number of victims and martial law (Brill, An-
teilnahme in Blau-Gelb, 2014). According to DzGP publicists, Sikor-
ski‘s words only aroused controversy in Poland, while the Western 
press considered them an expression of determination. In their 
opinion, Sikorski was well prepared, and the mission was success-
ful (Parafianowicz, Potocki, 2014). The media which rebutted the 
charges against the head of Polish diplomacy included Rz. That 
broadsheet’s columnist stressed that, regardless of one’s attitude 
towards Sikorski, it should be admitted that he did a good job (pap, 
21.02.2014) and helped negotiate an agreement (Słojewska, 2014). 
For Rz and GW there wasn’t a shadow of doubt about the Polish 
foreign minister’s dominant contribution. Wieliński of GW explained 
that EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton had asked Sikorski 
to organize a mission to Kiev. Contrary to suggestions concerning 
a different composition for this mission, Sikorski decided to mount 
a Weimar Triangle mission – with the foreign ministers of Germany 
and France (Wieliński, Jak Sikorski negocjował w Kijowie, 2014). 
Jan Haszczyński of Rz saw in the events in Kiev signs of a revival of 
Polish diplomacy, whose actions filled him with pride (Haszczyński, 
Wielkie symbole Ukrainy, 2014). GW and Rz cited the opinions 
of politicians and experts highly estimating the achievements of 
European, including Polish diplomacy, indicating that the Polish 
partner had to be counted with in matters concerning Ukraine. 
That which GW recognized as Poland’s asset in the international 
arena, i.e. the cooperation of the Weimar Triangle ministers within 
the framework of EU diplomacy (Bielecki, Grochal, 2014), for NDz 
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journalists became an opportunity to demonstrate Polish policy’s 
over-dependence on Community strategy, including the traditional 
Russian-German intimacy. On the pages of NDz, journalist stressed 
German diplomacy’s care in maintaining close contact with Rus-
sia, for instance in the form of telephoning Putin with information 
about the intentions of the Weimar Triangle’s foreign ministers (IK, 
PAP, 2014).
Analysing the period from February to May 2014 in order 
to evaluate the activities of the Polish Minister in resolving the con-
flict between Russia and Ukraine, much good will towards him can 
be seen in German media4. Focusing on the efforts of Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, Der Spiegel dedicated an article to the Polish chief of 
diplomacy in its May issue with the telling title ‘Mr. Perfekt aus 
Warschau’ [‘Mr. Perfect from Warsaw’], noting that Sikorski, known 
for his hard-line policy towards Russia, is – since the outbreak of 
the Ukrainian crisis at the latest – playing a new role in foreign 
policy, and Ukraine has become his greatest mission. The article’s 
author Jan Puhl showed that Sikorski, earlier than others, warned 
that the future of Europe would be decided in Ukraine. At the same 
time he criticized Germany, which, like many others failed to listen 
to his opinion, preoccupied with maintaining good relations with 
Moscow. It turned out that Sikorski was right, and now hopes that 
NATO and the EU will not continue to treat Russia as they have so 
far – with such timidity and uncertainty (Puhl, 2014). Marko Martin 
of Die Welt wrote about the great Europeans from Warsaw: Donald 
Tusk and the polyglot Radek Sikorski (Marko, 2014). Highly rated 
were Sikorski’s chances of being awarded the post of the EU’s Com-
missioner for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy after Catherine 
Ashton leaves office (Brössler, Brill, 2014).
4 In Germany, Radoslaw Sikorski was given good press, thanks probably in 
large part to Radoslaw Sikorski‘s Berlin speech to the German Society for Foreign 
Policy (November 28, 2011). Przemyslaw Zurawski vel Grajewski notes, however, 
that this speech delivered during the negotiations on the fiscal pact, although 
overestimated as to its pro German character (Polish Radio: ‘Minister paid trib-
ute to Berlin’, Wiadomości24 ‘Sikorski paid his own special tribute to Berlin’), was 
a clear manifestation of Polish support for German leadership in the EU and so 
too was it taken, not only in Poland but also in the German media. Grajewski also 
drew attention to the fact that Sikorski, referring to the state budgets and federal 
budget in the US, called for a communitization of Euro zone debts, which is at 
odds with the German government’s position and the attitude of German public 
opinion. P. Zurawski vel Grajewski, ‘Polska wobec przywództwa Niemiec w Unii 
Europejskiej’, Przegląd Zachodni, 2014, s. 125.
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Good press for the head of Polish diplomacy and such declara-
tions of support do not coincide with the actual decisions that were 
of crucial importance for the Polish government and society: sanc-
tions against Russia or NATO‘s strengthening on the eastern flanks 
of the Union. The unbending attitude of the Russian Federation 
proved the value of the Polish-German partnership. Response to the 
Crimean crisis (March 2014) revealed differences in perception, and 
as a result, in the positions of EU partners.
German journalists stressed that the Poles are watching the 
revolutionary upheaval in Ukraine like few other nations in Europe 
(Brill, Anteilnahme in Blau-Gelb, 2014). It was stressed that inde-
pendence of the country on the Dnepr was treated by the Polish elite 
as a central point of geopolitics that guarantee protection against 
Russia (Schuller, 2013). According to German journalists, along 
with the Crimean crisis, traumatic memories returned to those liv-
ing on the Vistula (Brill, Traumatische Erinnerungen, höchste Ner-
vosität, 2014). They recalled that in Central and Eastern Europe, 
there is no greater trauma than an agreement concluded over the 
heads of smaller neighbours (Brill, Rückkehr der Angst, 2014), es-
pecially in Poland, at whose request a NATO summit was called in 
accordance with Article 4 (Busse, 2014). The German press quoted 
Sikorski, who at a meeting of EU foreign ministers compared Russia 
to an insatiable predator (Wittrock, 2014; Brill, 2014).
Activities in the international arena aiming to increase the par-
ticipation of NATO (Wittrock, 2014) were contrasted by the German 
press with Steinmeier’s poised attitude (Weiland, 2014). FAZ in the 
title of an article concerning the agreements between the foreign min-
isters of the Weimar Triangle on a common position towards NATO, 
stressed that Steinmeier ruled out Ukraine’s entry to NATO. Der 
Spiegel, pointing out that Steinmeier’s statement was full of uncer-
tainty, accepted with relief a resounding ‘no’ for Ukraine’s entry 
to the NATO pact (Weiland, 2014). Die Welt decided that Sikorski‘s 
statement concerning the stationing of military bases in Poland was 
made by the Polish minister half in jest (Jungholt, 2014). Although 
as a joke, except that an April fool’s one, Sikorski was to make it in 
the context of information about the withdrawal of Russian troops, 
which filled Steinmeier with optimism. How vain proved the informa-
tion in the title of a SZ article ‘NATO disputes information about the 
withdrawal of Russian troops’, where the German journalist ex-
plained Berlin’s caution in terms of fear of further escalation and 
pointed to the German Social Democratic party, which in his opinion 
extremely sceptically approached the idea of increasing the military 
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presence in the eastern flank of the alliance (Roßmann, 2014). Dis-
cussions on differences in the approach to the Ukrainian crisis 
among the German coalition partners were also to be found in the 
Polish press. For Rafał Woś writing in the columns of DzGP, declara-
tions by German diplomats concerning NATO were proof of the vic-
tory of the Steinmeier concept, which envisages a very high level of 
understanding for Russia and its vital interests in the countries of 
the former Soviet Union (Woś, Powrót Steinmeiera, 2014). Referring 
to Steinmeier’s statement taking into account Russia wishes con-
cerning the substance of the NATO declaration made during the 
1997summit in Madrid, Piotr Semka on the pages of Rz asked if 
Germany and Russia were still rivals or secret allies. In an article 
published in April 2014 entitled ‘Alians czarnych orłów’, the column-
ist pointed to the left side of the political spectrum hindering tougher 
action against Russia. In a polemic between journalists, Wiesław 
Wawrzyniak’s wrote retorting the above opinion and as a counter-
argument cited the harsh words directed by Steinmeier to those 
gathered at a conference of industrialists, namely that there can be 
no double-tracking – a policy criticizing Putin and an economy doing 
business as usual, as if nothing had happened (Wawrzyniak, 2014). 
GW defended Steinmeier, stressing that the foreign minister is faced 
with voices of opposition in his own party, which come from older 
generation Social Democrats who understand Russia (Wieliński, 
Po co Sikorski i Steinmeier ryzykują podróż do Rosji?, 2014). A decid-
edly negative assessment of Steinmeier’s attitude was expressed by 
the rp.pl blogger Anna Kozicka-Kołaczkowska under the revealing 
title ‘Kiniarz Steinmeier dla upupionych’. In her analysis, she cited 
the extremely vulgar veto by the Germans (...) against US troops help-
ing the Poles, calling Steinmeier’s position anti-EU and anti-NATO 
(Kozicka-Kołaczkowska, 2014). Frank-Walter Steinmeier is the most 
popular politician in Russia, wrote Anna Zechenter on the pages of 
NDz. This politician so understanding of Putin – continued the jour-
nalist – embodies everything that is valued in the Kremlin, especially 
the continuation of a friendly policy toward Russia focused on doing 
business without a word of criticism of the Russian authority. Ac-
cording to the author of the text, the citizens of Germany have been 
frightened by Russia, and have forgotten the images from Maidan 
and their own indignation at Putin. They are afraid of losing their 
jobs and a slowdown in their economic growth (Zachenter, 2014). 
Citing surveys of public opinion in Germany, according to which 
Germany refuses to strengthen NATO’s presence, Rz wrote that the 
head of the German Foreign Ministry, questioning the stationing of 
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NATO forces in Poland, reflects the social mood in Germany (p.jen, 
2014). GW argued that Steinmeier is not interested in a dirty peace 
that would satisfy German business circles and a large section of 
society. Confirmation that the German foreign minister does not 
want to come to an agreement behind the backs of his allies was 
to be a visit of the Polish and German foreign ministers with their 
Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov. According to GW, the ministers, 
aware of the risk and the impossibility of convincing the Russians 
to accept the EU position, wanted to show that the EU speaks with 
one voice (Wieliński, Po co Sikorski i Steinmeier ryzykują podróż 
do Rosji?, 2014). Wieliński believed that the Kaliningrad Triangle is 
a good formula for negotiations. On behalf of the EU, the most im-
portant representatives of old and new Europe travelled to enter into 
talks with Russia. It was explained that this was first and foremost 
in order to maintain communications and present what position the 
EU represents (Wieliński, Rozbrajanie ukraińskiego kryzysu, 2014). 
An Rz publicist argued convincingly that the initiative of both minis-
ters is part of a much broader EU and US diplomatic campaign 
aimed at arriving at an agreement with Putin that will give the new 
president of Ukraine time to stabilize the country (Wieliński, Rozbra-
janie ukraińskiego kryzysu, 2014). Filip Memches claimed that such 
thinking is more naive than realistic (Memches, 2014). According 
to Rz, it was the Russians who pushed for this meeting, who via Rus-
sian TV channels subordinate to the Government reported the visit 
of the Polish and German foreign ministers on the Neva in a tone of 
triumph (Bielecki, 2014). Also in the reporting by NDz, it was the 
Russians who reminded everyone of the scheduled meeting of the 
Trinity, and when it did come to a meeting, designated a business 
class hotel located in a side street as the venue for the proceedings. 
According to NDz columnists, the meeting between Sikorski and 
Steinmeier before the visit with Lavrov was short and ineffective. In-
deed they failed to convince Lavrov, and the Polish foreign minister 
spoke about the differences in sensitivity between Germany and Po-
land (Falkowski, 2014). The purpose behind the meeting was de-
fended by the German daily Die Welt, which recognized it as proof of 
Berlin’s interest in close cooperation with Warsaw (Sturm, Stein-
meiers Diplomatie ohne Prunk und Protz, 2014). According to that 
Springer-owned daily’s publicist, thanks to the latest signals of a re-
laxation of tension, the meeting planned during the Munich Security 
Conference was not cancelled, but took place only after the first at-
tempts to establish contact between Poroshenko and Putin, while the 
talks with Lavrov alone lasted three hours, which was considered 
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evidence that Russia was also interested in the meeting (Sturm, 
Steinmeiers Diplomatie ohne Prunk und Protz, 2014). As initiator of 
the meeting FAZ pointed to Sikorski, who sought a meeting with Lav-
rov, in order to show how much Warsaw was interested in avoiding 
a long-running conflict in Ukraine. The German press quoted the 
Polish minister who defended the idea of his visit by stressing that 
diplomacy does not mean simply talking with those with whom we 
agree (Sattar, Das Lachen des Herrn Lawrow, 2014). SZ interpreted 
Sikorski’s desire to go as an attempt to get over his image as a politi-
cian hostile to Russia. In that newspaper’s view, the minister made 
the decision despite the criticism and controversy in Poland. SZ has 
repeatedly drawn attention to the domestic political disputes and 
controversies that Sikorski’s decisions and statements have elicited 
in Poland. Among other things, Sikorski‘s statement exhorting 
Ukraine to continue the dialogue with Russia (Brössler, Brill, 2014). 
Lavrov’s laughter when Sikorski asked whether the situation in the 
Crimea would not be repeated was – according to FAZ (Sattar, Das 
Lachen des Herrn Lawrow, 2014) and Der Spiegel – to once again 
disappoint the head of German diplomacy, who prior to the visit 
thought he noticed signs of tensions easing (Gebauer, Entspannung-
sübung im Ambasador, 2014). SZ was not surprised by the result of 
the talks, which showed how risky the trip to St. Petersburg was. But 
was surprised that in view of the situation, Steinmeier saw a light at 
the end of the tunnel. In the context of Steinmeier’s optimism ex-
pressed in his unchanging attitude towards Russia, German journal-
ist Klaus Bachmann on the pages of GW summed up the German 
government‘s policy towards the Ukrainian crisis: According to the 
grotesque logic of the German government and a large section of the 
media, Russia can do what it wants – can take Germans prisoner or 
release them, occupy Crimea or not, set fire to further Ukrainian towns 
or temporarily order a withdrawal of the separatists – and that is the 
only reason to ‘make further diplomatic efforts’ (the formula used by 
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier), and until they bring results, 
lay aside sanctions until a later date (Bachmann, 2014).
The June 2014 meeting in St. Petersburg was the last action 
performed in close diplomatic cooperation between the Polish and 
German foreign ministers. The next meetings within the framework 
of EU foreign policy took place without inviting the participation of 
the Polish partner. GW columnists interpreted Sikorski‘s absence 
at the Berlin meeting of the heads of foreign ministries from Ger-
many, France, Russia and Ukraine (August 2014) as pushing Brus-
sels and Poland out of the negotiations (Bielecki, Wroński, 2014), 
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thus weakening Europe (Wieliński, Berlińskie rozmowy o ukraińskim 
pokoju. Dlaczego bez nas?, 2014). DzGP wrote that the talks held 
in mid-August in Berlin were the first major success for Russia: it 
managed to marginalize the Weimar Triangle (26.08.2014). Rz feared 
that Berlin’s broad diplomatic offensive to end the Russian-Ukrain-
ian war intended to confirm Germany’s dominant role in the central 
and eastern European region, to push the US out and maintain 
a strategic partnership with Russia (Rak, 2014). For the conserva-
tive NDz daily this is further evidence of the incapacity of the Polish 
government and a pathetic failure on the part of Polish diplomacy.
German press openly admitted that the Ukraine crisis had not 
only divided Polish-German partners but the entire West. The fo-
cal point in the differing positions was the approach to Russia. The 
press beyond the Oder pointed to the disparity between politics 
and the media on the one hand and German society on the other, 
which shows a lot of understanding for Russia (expressed i.a. in the 
pro-Russian tweets looking very much like propaganda controlled 
from Moscow). It pointed out that those media opposed to this way 
of thinking was accused of bias (Staib, 2014). The German pub-
lic’s attitude is confirmed by the results of public opinion surveys 
conducted in Germany, in which can be seen a clear drop in sym-
pathy towards Russia and a sense of threat from Putin‘s policies. 
However, Russia remains a country highly valued by German citi-
zens. The attitude of the Germans to the conflict may be explained 
by a fear of war and a conviction that, despite the declarations of 
politicians5 there is no need to increase Germany’s responsibilities 
on the international stage6.
The end of 2013 brought disappointment to EU eastern policy, 
but also hope for a new quality built on Polish-German coopera-
tion. The press in Poland and Germany responded positively to the 
strengthening of bilateral cooperation declarations, recognizing 
the potential in cooperation between their foreign ministers. The 
Sikorski-Steinmeier duo was written up as a spectacular, albeit 
short-lived success. The hopes of continuing close cooperation in 
the Weimar or Kaliningrad Triangle format in order to resolve the 
conflict in Ukraine were in the end not fulfilled. The Polish press 
accused Steinmeier of – taking advantage of the passivity of his 
5 Compare Munich Security Conference (January 2014), in which representa-
tives of the new government and the German president Joachim Gauck called for 
Germany’s greater responsibility on the international stage.
6 Public opinion polls conducted by deutschlandtrend.de and the German 
demoscope centre Allensbacher Institut were taken into account. 
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Christian Democratic partner – becoming a driving force for a con-
ciliatory policy towards Russia. Along with harsh criticism, there 
appeared attempts to justify the actions of the German Minister 
by the need to be guided by party loyalty, the feelings of society or 
the interests of the German economy. The German press duly re-
ported the activities of the head of Polish diplomacy, personifying 
a hard line against Russia, but also perceived a policy aiming for 
an agreement with Russia even at the expense of criticism from his 
fellow countrymen. The press in both Poland and Germany pointed 
to a diversity of the causes for the difficulties in shaping EU policy 
towards its Eastern neighbour.
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